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TANF Policy Implementation:
The Invisible Barrier
ROBERTA REHNER IVERSEN
University of Pennsylvania
School of Social Work
Barriers to participation in welfare-to-work programs are generally de-
scribed in terms of human and social capital. Findings from case exam-
ination of four Philadelphia-area welfare-to-work programs under TANF
suggest that theory about policy implementation is more applicable. Faulty
policy logic, organizational and personnel incompetence, and inadequate
coordination between and within funding, referral, program, and employer
organizations regularly resulted in delayed program start-ups and strained
program operations. Generally invisible and absent from research atten-
tion, these implementation delays and strains impeded program staff efforts
and harmed TANF recipients. States' 24-month time limit policies are a
critical target for advocacy efforts.
TANF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: THE INVISIBLE BARRIER
Passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996 (P.L. 104-193) replaced
sixty years of federal entitlements to needy mothers and children
with block grants to the states called Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (TANF). These policy changes resulted in a new
configuration of social programs designed to move individuals
from entitlement to public assistance to wage work in the labor
market: in common parlance, from "welfare to work." In essence,
responsibility for the poor passed from the federal government
to the states.
Two critical differences pertain to TANF assistance compared
to that of its federal predecessor, Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC). First, adults in families receiving assistance
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under the block grant must participate in work activities after
receiving assistance for 24 months. Second, mandatory time limits
now exist in all states, resulting in a maximum of 5 years of
allowable TANF assistance over a person's lifetime. Although
twenty percent of welfare caseloads may qualify for "hardship"
exemption from this 5-year limit, no guidelines for this categorical
exemption have been formulated to date. Moreover, federal ex-
emption from cutoff may not apply to states' work requirements.
States now have broad latitude to design critical features of
their welfare policy, such as recipient criteria, time limits, and
exemption guidelines, as well as its overall aims. For example, the
purpose of Pennsylvania's basic welfare law before spring 1996
was "to promote the welfare and happiness of all the people of
the Commonwealth by providing public assistance." After spring
1996, Pennsylvania's version of TANF, Act No. 1996-35 (Act 35),
intended "to promote the self-sufficiency of all the people in the
Commonwealth" (Raffel, 1998:4).
Over the past several decades, sociological theory about hu-
man and social capital informed the content and format of
welfare-to-work policy and programs. Human capital is created
by changing persons so as to give them skills and capabilities
that make them able to act in new ways (Coleman, 1990: 304).
Social capital develops within varied forms of organizational and
interpersonal structures (Coleman, 1990), facilitating actions of
individuals within the social structure. According to this frame-
work, individuals receiving TANF assistance who are unable to
find a job on their own or through a mandated 8-week job search
program are referred to welfare-to-work skills training programs
directly related to employment.
States' experiences under TANF, however, belie the ease and
fluidity of this formula and the appropriateness of the frame-
work. The 1999 report to Congress from the national evaluation of
the Welfare-to-Work Grants Program (Perez-Johnson & Hershey,
1999) briefly mentions difficulties with participant recruitment,
eligibility criteria, service delivery and funding. However, a more
complete assessment is not expected until fall 2000 at the earliest.
A report from Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation
(Quint et al., 1999) found similar difficulties in 4 U.S. cities, but
this research was conducted at an early period of TANF imple-
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mentation. Other than these reports, program-level findings are
absent from the research literature.
I report here on implementation problems found in welfare-
to-work programs in the Philadelphia area under TANF policy
Case study research revealed massive delays in program start-
ups and strained program operations due in part to faulty policy
logic, organizational and personnel incompetence, and inade-
quate coordination between and within funding, referral, pro-
gram, and employer organizations. Such barriers to implemen-
tation occurred regularly, but received little public or research
attention compared to the focus on skill and attitudinal barriers
among TANF recipients and wage and retention barriers in the
service sector jobs some recipients obtained.
While human and social capital barriers undoubtedly influ-
ence the transition from welfare to work, this paper presents
an alternative position that theory about policy implementation
may better explain the realities of participants' experiences in
programs under TANE We suggest that reliance on human and
social capital concepts does not capture the interaction of various
federal, state, local, and direct service actors who jointly partici-
pate in the implementation process (Jansson, 1990.) Without open
acknowledgement of these "invisible" barriers by policymakers
and program officials, even dedicated and competent program
staff incur impediments to fulfilling their jobs. Ultimately, TANF
recipients bear the brunt of implementation problems as they use
up valuable months of their eligibility for assistance in the interim.
At this critical period in which 24-month time limits are reached
and assistance can be cut off, information from our study may
suggest how to influence policy and program implementation
in ways that benefit the individuals most in need-the TANF
program participants.
Methodology
Two colleagues and I conducted field research between
September 1998 and June 1999 in four Philadelphia-area welfare-
to-work programs (Iversen, Rich, & Lewis, 1998):
* A union-sponsored certified nursing assistant training program
expecting to serve 540 TANF recipients and 60 non-custodial
fathers over a three-year period, 1998-2001;
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" A hospital-based (non-certified) specialty care training program
for work with adults and children with disabilities and chronic
illness; serving 20 TANF recipients per cycle, including one year
of follow-up-ultimate number of cycles is undetermined;
* A homeless shelter providing on-site job-training in housekeep-
ing and food service and off-site certified nursing assistance
training; initially intending to serve up to 100 women, but
mandated by funding source to serve 400 TANF recipients over
a two-year period, 1999-2000;
" A suburban family agency contracted to conduct in-depth as-
sessments of TANF participants in three welfare-to-work pro-
grams, estimating to serve about 50-100, although the final
number is undetermined.
All four programs are sponsored by non-profit service or-
ganizations in Philadelphia or the nearby suburbs. Despite the
varied sizes of the work program contracts, we found virtual
unanimity of issues, problems and concerns among the agencies.
Common elements across the four programs included emphasis
on participant assessment, individualized case management that
included both instrumental and supportive assistance, and job-
specific training linked with area-employer input and needs. The
four organizations had years of experience working with welfare
recipients, and the services of each were guided by missions ded-
icated to improving social and economic conditions among poor
people. All were also experienced in the provision of employment
or vocationally-focused services, except that the family agency's
service emphasis was improved psychosocial status wherein em-
ployment was a concern but not the central focus. Through fund-
ing requirements and design, the programs recruited participants
who were near their 2-year time limits. Moreover, these programs
were mandated to target TANF recipients with barriers such
as no high school diploma or GED, drug and alcohol histories,
homelessness, poor work histories, or mental health concerns.
The data set consists of detailed notes and verbatim comments
gathered from multiple in-person interviews, observations, and
discussions with 30 staff members who represented the full uni-
verse of staff employed in the 4 agencies' welfare-to-work pro-
grams. Twenty-four staff members were women and 6 were men.
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Nine were African American, 2 Latina, 1 Asian American, and
18 were white. Twenty of the 30 staff held master's degrees in
social work and the remaining ten had college degrees. Data was
also drawn from over a dozen phone and e-mail exchanges and
observation of multiple program staff-participant work sessions
at the four programs, each of which lasted at least 3 hours. While
our findings cannot be considered representative of all welfare-
to-work programs because of the limited sample size and the non-
randomized study design, we address issues of implementation
in more depth than has been possible to date by the national
evaluations. In addition, unlike the limited extant research, our
study focused on program-level data-particularly from the per-
spective of program staff-and highlighted the experiences of
TANF participants considered most needy and difficult to place
in employment. Finally, our case example format is character-
istic of implementation research (Wood & Paulsell, 1999) and
our methodology parallels that of the larger body of welfare-
to-work demonstration research (Rangarajan, Meckstroth & No-
vak, 1998).
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION:
THEORY AND CASE EXAMPLES
Policy analysts view implementation as a dynamic process
that takes place over time (Axinn & Levin, 1997; Bardach, 1977;
Hogwood & Gunn, 1984; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1979; Schneider
& Ingram, 1997). They also emphasize that implementation of
a large-scale federal project is exceedingly difficult. According
to the seminal work on policy implementation, "program" sig-
nifies the conversion of a policy hypothesis into governmental
action: a process of interaction between the setting of goals and
actions geared to achieving them (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973).
Analysts suggest that three elements influence the adequacy of
implementation: the logic of the policy, the competence of relevant
personnel, and the nature of the coordination or cooperation the
policy requires (Weimer & Vining, 1992; Bardach, 1977). Although
these elements are interrelated (Rein, 1983), each is illustrated
separately here in order to identify implementation barriers that
might be open to redress.
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Policy Logic
Policies and the programs instituted by them generally re-
flect sociological and economic theories about the way the world
works (Jansson, 1990). According to implementation theory, a
policy must be based upon a valid hypothesis about cause and
effect (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984). In Pennsylvania and many other
states, the guiding policy directive to TANF programs was "quick
attachment" to the workforce, a directive based in part on theory
about human and social capital. Accordingly, some individuals
receiving TANF assistance were believed to have sufficient ed-
ucational capital to work, but needed additional behavioral and
motivational capital that would be provided by 8-week job readi-
ness and job search assistance programs. Other individuals were
viewed as having insufficient educational and behavioral capital
that could be mediated by skills accumulation and case manage-
ment supports in 16- or 20-week job training programs that were
directly related to employment. The quick attachment directive
also assumed that these individual and organizational remedies
would be sufficient for successful transitions to work, thus in-
dividuals who did not comply with policy directives would be
sanctioned or cut off from further financial or training assistance.
Policy implementers regularly expect too much too soon,
especially in regard to programs in which attitudes or behavior
are involved (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984). Evaluations of welfare-
to-work and job-training initiatives before TANF found modest
success in increasing participants' earnings through enhancing
human and social capital. Successes were attributed to achieve-
ment of education (Briggs, 1999), employer-guided skill devel-
opment (Perlmutter, 1997), supportive and trusted case man-
agement relationships (Rangarajan, Meckstroth, & Novak, 1998;
Sansone, 1998), and referral to community resources (Pavetti, Ol-
son, Pindus & Pernas, 1996). However, achieving self-sufficiency
generally took at least five years. Such a time frame under TANF
would constitute or exceed both the 24- and 60-month time limits
for many TANF recipients.
Other scholarship is more pessimistic about wage growth for
women who work their way off welfare (Butler & Seguino, 1998;
Edin, Harris, & Sandefur, 1998). Human capital barriers included
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learning disabilities and/or lack of a high school degree or GED
(Burtless, 1997; Cancian & Meyer, 1995), substance abuse, depres-
sion and physical or mental disabilities (Jayakody, Danziger &
Pollack, 1998), and inadequate parenting skills (Pavetti, Olson,
Pindus & Pernas, 1996). Social capital barriers included family
responsibilities, inadequate or costly childcare (Cancian & Meyer,
1995), social isolation (Wilson, 1996), inadequate employment
networks (Marcenko & Fagan, 1996), and conflicts with supervi-
sors and co-workers (Berg, Olson, & Conrad, 1992; Rooney, 1999).
All are aspects of the work transition that also take considerable
time to remedy, whether through interpersonal supports or struc-
tural changes.
Based on the research literature and our study findings, "quick
attachment" policy logic is faulty in its overreliance on human
and social capital concepts and its inattention to the amount of
time necessary for both individuals and organizations to ensure
the welfare-to-work transition. Implementation problems result-
ing from faulty logic in TANF policy influenced and were com-
pounded by barriers resulting from organizational and personnel
incompetence.
Organizational and Personnel Competence
Organizational Competence. At policy onset, the main conduit
for TANF policy implementation, the state Department of Public
Welfare (DPW), was technologically unable to track individuals
on or when they left the welfare rolls. The DPW initially predicted
there would be more demand for service in Philadelphia than
the existing capacity could supply. Over 27,000 individuals were
expected to reach the 24-month time limit between March and
June 1999, yet only 7,500 program slots were available (Raffel,
Mooney & Finney, 1999). After the first year of implementation,
it appeared that the supply of programs exceeded participant
demand. Fifteen thousand TANF recipients were expected to
enroll in programs sponsored by Greater Philadelphia Works, the
city's welfare-to-work system, but only 7,995 actually did (Yant,
1999). Tracking capacity was unable to explain this disconnect.
As a result, our Philadelphia programs had difficulty recruit-
ing sufficient participants and similar difficulties have since been
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reported by other city programs (Cooper & Blanchette, 1999).
The slow pace of enrollment necessitated unexpected outreach
by staff at the union- and hospital-based programs who had to
conduct on-site recruitment at county assistance offices several
days a week in order to fill program slots. On average, 2 months
of active outreach was necessary for each program cycle-time
that program staff preferred to have spent on direct instruction.
Even when recruitment resulted in a cohort of applicants,
the programs experienced distressingly low yields that resulted
in further start-up delays. Assessments for the first cycle of the
certified nursing program began in early February 1999. Of the 58
TANF recipients signed up by the CAO for the initial orientation,
25 attended, yielding 16 for the program. It took five subsequent
orientation groups yielding about 75 acceptances to comprise
the initial class of 38. The start-up accordingly was delayed for
two months, not beginning until early April. Similarly, after on-
site recruitment in other homeless shelters, a list of 30 "accepts"
yielded only 3 participants (10%) who met CAO eligibility for
the shelter work program. Ultimately, to reach the requisite total
of 25 to begin the program, over 130 applicants were recruited.
This process lasted from October 1998 to March 1999, delaying
program start-up for 6 months. Neither the programs nor the
CAOs knew why the yields were so low, although they suspected
that some opted out because of career disinterest and others were
concerned about passing drug/alcohol or criminal eligibility re-
quirements. Inappropriate referrals may also have been a cause.
The Department of Public Welfare was technologically unable
to identify essential recipient characteristics among those remain-
ing on the rolls which meant that the primary referral agencies,
County Assistance Offices (CAOs), could not generate the infor-
mation needed by the implementing agencies to effect an appro-
priate match between a given client and a given service (Bardach,
1977). As other departments did across the country when TANF
policies were adopted, DPW relied on estimates based on welfare
statistics prior to the introduction of time limits. Accordingly,
DPW estimated that one-third of the current rolls consisted of
persons considered able to find employment on their own. A
second third was expected to find jobs with only the 8-week job
search/job readiness assistance. The final third, those considered
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"hard to employ," was expected to need skill training and other
instrumental support in order to become employed. In reality,
state data systems were unable to assess the certainty of these
estimates. It is still not known if these three categories describe
the Pennsylvania TANF population, whether TANF participants
spread out evenly in the three categories if the categories are in
fact correct, and where the thousands of individuals in the "hard
to employ" group are. It is clear that they are not waiting in line
for program referrals at the County Assistance Offices (CAOs).
At the union-based program, funding from their Department
of Labor grant specified that two-thirds (70%) of the program
participants must be designated "hard to employ," whereas one-
third (30%) must be long-term welfare recipients. After six months
of operation, the proportion of program attendees was the mirror
opposite: 70% were long-term recipients and 30% were "hard to
employ." As one staff member noted, "no-one knows where the
70-percenters are," least of all the CAOs and the DPW.
Personnel Competence. An interrelated cause of inappropriate
referral and delayed enrollment stemmed from the fact that CAO
staff who had been benefits administrators before TANF were
expected to become work-program specialists in a short time
period, without new training and without having appropriate
educational backgrounds. Characteristically in large bureaucratic
organizations, new task assignments are given officials or profes-
sionals who were well able to carry out their old tasks, but unqual-
ified to carry out the new ones (Bardach, 1977). The multiplicity
of new roles for benefits administrators or eligibility workers is
graphically illustrated by the array of new titles: employment
advisors, job developers, job coaches, and employment coordina-
tors. As TANF policy was implemented, the Department of Public
Welfare believed that existing personnel could rapidly learn new
areas of competence. The long history of adversarial relationships
between benefits administration and social services set the stage
for this implementation barrier (Hagen, 1994; Wyers, 1991).
In particular, eligibility workers were now expected to forge
relationships with TANF recipients based on mutuality and reci-
procity rather than hierarchy and autonomy (Valbrun, 1998). For
a TANF recipient to qualify for the shelter welfare-to-work pro-
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gram, her CAO "employment advisor" needed to be able to
identify if the recipient were living in a shelter. In their position
as administrators, few caseworkers were trained to ask this ques-
tion, thus shelter staff believed that many eligible participants
were missed. While similar assessment needs may be addressed
in CAO worker retraining, such large-scale reeducation takes
time (Stovall, 1999). Doubting the ease of this transition, family
agency staff reported that administrators in the suburban CAO
asked for volunteers to change from benefits administrators to
"caseworkers."
Worse yet, perhaps confused by the profusion of new roles
and functions, CAO workers frequently did not give work-
program participants information about their continued eligibil-
ity for Food Stamp and Medicaid benefits or childcare and trans-
portation allowances (Slavin, 1999; Swarns, 1999). In addition,
the DPW erroneously cut off 30,000 parents from childcare al-
lowances they were eligible for, resulting in many work-program
dropouts before the benefits were reinstated several months later.
These infractions compounded the penalty to TANF recipients of
the time lost by inappropriate referral to job training programs.
Consistent with implementation theory, however, such variation
in how different workers respond to different situations is preva-
lent in social institutions (Bardach, 1977).
Cumulatively then, faulty policy logic and organizational
and personnel incompetence contributed to delays and strains
in program operations. These delays and strains were further
compounded by inter- and intra-organizational coordination
problems.
Coordination Between and Within Organizations
Coordination, or the dynamic process of operations or activ-
ities that affect relevant program outputs, is perhaps the most
compelling barrier to implementation in public programs (Bar-
dach, 1977). Adding to program delays caused by the lack of
recipient information, which we attribute in the above discus-
sion to problems of competence rather than coordination, we
found that funding requirements, characteristics of TANF refer-
rals, and welfare-to-work program eligibility requirements were
frequently mismatched.
Implementation 149
Funding Coordination. TANF funding streams in Pennsylvania
are complex and confusing, as Figure 1 illustrates, affecting both
program participants and staff.' The DPW distributes state wel-
fare funds directly to TANF programs such as the shelter's
welfare-to-work effort through a special stream called Commu-
nity Solutions. The DPW also distributes combined federal and
state funds through county Private Industry Councils.' The coun-
cils administered these funds to our four programs through in-
termediaries such as Greater Philadelphia Works (GPW) or Sin-
gle Point of Contact (SPOC). A separate stream of non-TANF
funds from the federal Department of Labor (DOL) Competitive
Welfare-to-Work (WtW) Grant Program was also filtered through
Greater Philadelphia Works to WtW awardees such as the union-
based program, and a stream of federal JTPA Title IIA funds
goes directly to the hospital-based program. Contradictory eli-
gibility criteria and program requirements are predictable when
programs have multiple sources of funding.
For example, the funding guidelines of both nursing-related
programs required targeting "hard to employ" individuals who,
among other criteria, "require substance abuse treatment for em-
ployment." However, state legislation (PA-Act 14) prohibits per-
sons actively using drugs or alcohol from either training or work-
ing as certified nursing assistants in nursing homes-precisely the
jobs for which the programs were training participants. Because
CAOs are not required to screen for substance use before sending
TANF recipients to apply for jobs or training programs, some
participants began both nursing-related programs to find out 3 to
6 weeks later that their drug and alcohol test performance prohib-
ited their continuation in the program. As a result, the individual's
time and energy were wasted, months on TANF continued to
build, and the program's resources were spent fruitlessly.
Funding criteria also produced administrative strain. The
funding guidelines of the shelter's Community Solutions grant
resulted in huge up-front costs for hiring new work program
staff yet allocated only $200 at participant enrollment. The shelter
received no additional money from Community Solutions until
the trainee was in a job for 1 day, a bit more when the trainee
was in the job 6 months, and the final funding at 1 year, ex-
acerbating resource strain. Extremely heavy costs at the front
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end coupled with funding at the back end necessitated their
drawing on private contributions originally intended for other
purposes and truncated other budget items such as a planned
evaluation project and necessary follow-up tracking of former
participants.
Finally, funding criteria also produced disconnects between
the goals of work programs and the needs and desires of employer
organizations. Employers serving as advisors to the hospital-
based program indicated at the end of cycle 1 that they preferred
to hire graduates with a high school diploma or GED. Yet the
program's SPOC funding mandated service to TANF recipients
without diplomas or GEDs. To fulfill these contradictory criteria,
the cycle 2 program included more hours of GED preparation
than cycle 1 had. Staff members considered this costly to par-
ticipants, however, as it reduced the amount of job-specific con-
tent they could deliver. Moreover, many participants were not
able to complete their GED exams during the 16-week program,
which reduced their employability potential and jeopardized the
job placement rate set by the funding agency as a condition for
program reimbursement.
Procedural Coordination. Procedural as well as funding compli-
cations caused organizational delays and strains. The longer the
chain of causality and the more numerous the reciprocal rela-
tionships among the links, the more complex implementation
becomes (Pressman & Wildavsky,1973, p. xvi). In a federal system
such as the U.S., programs can become overextended in terms of
both causal chains and numbers of participating agencies. In addi-
tion, decision-making processes internal to an organization often
necessitate consultations between numerous units, cumulatively
delaying action (Bardach, 1977).
The first cycle of the hospital-based program was initiated
relatively smoothly, but onset of the second cycle was delayed
almost 6 months. In the interim, the organization that sponsored
cycle I had merged with the hospital that would now sponsor cy-
cle 2, resulting in the following mixture of administrative strains
and program delays.
The PIC contract sent to the newly-merged hospital program
in January outlining the cycle 2 requirements specified that em-
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ployer organizations providing internships would be liable for
any suits instituted by TANF participants. While a similar re-
quirement had been acceptable to the cycle 1 organizatin, the
hospital legal department did not approve this clause. Because
post-merger changes in hospital management obscured the chain
of command, meetings between hospital and cycle 2 program
administrators to resolve the contract differences were regularly
delayed, canceled or postponed. A the same time, a flurry of
communications beteweeen the hsopital and Private Industry
Council administrators trying to reconcile the requirements of
each organization were also beset by mail- and procedural delays.
After several months, contract issues were finally resolved
yet onset of cycle 2 was delayed further because the funding
cycles of the PIC and the hospital now did not coincide. Finally
at the end of April the hospital approved the program. Slated
to begin in January 1999, after month-by-month delays in the
start-up schedule, cycle 2 began in mid-June. By that time, TANF
recipients had added six extra months to their 24-month time
clocks. In addition, staff morale and enthusiasm for the program
waned periodically during the wait, illustrating the "decay" that
can accompany delays (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973).
Staffing Coordination. New programs often place additional de-
mands on the administrative and staff systems in the parent
agency (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984) that delay and strain the quality
of program operations. The implementation of most programs
involves the hiring of new personnel and changes in the behavior
of existing personnel. At the administrative level, coherence of
parent agency and new program missions must be assessed.
Administrators who agree about a program's goals may disagree
about which people or organizational units should be running the
programs (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973). In the hospital-based
program, many staff positions changed after the merger. The
Project Director's main allegiance now was to the hospital, not to
the original organization. Her expertise, influence, and labor were
called upon to assure the existence of cycle 2 of the work program.
Only because of her professional prestige was she able to maneu-
ver a downsized cycle 1 specialist into the Program Coordinator
position and secure enough space for program activities.
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At the staff level, new programs require alterations in in-
terpersonal relationships and work habits, often contributing to
staff resistance (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1995). When programs
are designed, the core staff is likely to be small and committed
to the mission of the new program. By contrast, the new staff,
most of whom will be recruited into lower-level positions, seldom
have the same sense of ownership or level of enthusiasm as the
founding group (Patti, 1983).
The shelter program and the certified nursing program were
forced to integrate an influx of front-line practitioners within
a 1-2 month period of time. While both hired competent new
professionals, days were spent orienting and training the new
personnel at the same time as old and new staff were expected
to spend time in recruitment and training activities. These con-
current orientation and role demands strained continuity in ap-
plicant assessment practices and delayed delivery of program
content. In such situations, agencies may resort to creaming and
take only the clients who are easiest to handle, or have the best
fit with the professional aspirations of the caseworkers in the
agency (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 139). While we did not
find evidence of creaming, strains between professional aims and
TANF program requirements were evidenced by staff in their
program assessment and case management practices.
Initial assessments of participant eligibility for services and
training programs offered previously by the four agencies studied
were skewed in favor of psychosocial and motivational character-
istics. We found that even staff members trained in professional
social work were not able to accurately assess program appropri-
ateness for many TANF recipients referred by the CAO. Global
post-interview evaluations such as "enthusiastic," "very appro-
priate," and "wants to be in this program" were generally based
on the staff member's gut-level responses to the applicant's per-
sonal presentation. Such responses are considered unreliable and
invalid in vocational assessment literature (Schmidt & Hunter,
1998). Consequently, when these traditional behavioral markers
did not correlate with applicant enrollment, much less success in
the program, staff professionals felt stymied and their morale suf-
fered. Ultimately, both nursing-related programs and the family
agency moved to job-focused assessments oriented particularly
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for individuals moving from welfare to work (Iversen, 1998).
These new assessment formats emphasized prior work experi-
ences and job-specific skills (Janz, 1982) and job-related scenarios
that elicited how applicants would respond on the job (Huffcutt,
Roth & McDaniel, 1996).
We also found that program professionals had to make similar
adjustments in their training and case management interven-
tions with participants during program operation. Staff in all
four programs expanded their examination of structural barriers
to program and work success such as childcare, transportation,
and emergency financial needs. Program personnel found they
needed much more knowledge about welfare legislation and
benefit qualifications as well. As one staff member said, "I've
turned from a social worker to a benefits specialist." Such knowl-
edge, including how to access the Earned Income Tax Credit and
emergency utility assistance, is considered critical to participant
success (Rangarajan, Mekstroth & Novak, 1998).
New staff role requirements, similar to those experienced
in county assistance offices, confused participants and work-
ers alike. The family agency staff members were called "Job
Coaches," although they felt uncertain about exactly what the
title meant. Such difficulty with role clarity might jeopardize the
mutuality and trust that is built in the client-worker relationship
through openness and provision of information.
Adding to implementation stress, staff in all programs pro-
grams retained simultaneous commitments to other projects in
the agency. As Pressman and Wildavsky (1973, p. 99) noted, staff
participants may agree with a proposal, have no contradictory
commitments, and not prefer any alternative programs, but they
may have other projects of their own that demand time and
attention. Problems of staff in implementing a change are often
ignored. Changes frequently add new elements to a job, yet pro-
ponents of the change may not reallocate tasks or even recognize
the increased load (Brager & Holloway, 1978).
In cycle 1 of the hospital-based program, welfare-to-work
staff planned to spend one day a week on the program and four
days in their original full-time positions. Each found that their
program time amounted to at least two days a week, but the
requirements of their primary position were not altered. Similarly,
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in the family agency each worker started by conducting one
half-day assessment per month. Moreover, the agency contracted
initially with only one welfare-to-work program provider. Within
a year, the agency held contracts with three providers and staff
members conducted at least one assessment per week with little
to no relief from their regular full-time service schedule.
Conclusions and Recommendations
This paper reported findings about barriers to TANF policy
implementation based on field research in four Philadelphia-
area welfare-to-work programs: a union-based certified nursing
assistant program; a hospital-based (non-certified) specialty care
program; job programs sponsored by a homeless shelter; and a
family agency conducting assessments for local TANF programs.
The findings suggest that principles of policy implementation
are more applicable than human and social capital constructs
to understanding the current barriers to participation and suc-
cess in welfare-to-work programs under PRWORA and TANF
policies. Case examples illustrated how faulty policy logic, or-
ganizational and personnel incompetence, and inadequate inter-
and intra-organizational coordination resulted in severe delays
and strains in TANF programs. Most important, these "invisible"
implementation problems penalized TANF recipients severely as
they tried to move from welfare to work, depleting their time-
limited assistance as they waited for programs to start or finding
themselves in inappropriate programs. Notably, most of the prob-
lems could have been predicted and prevented through attention
to the significant body of literature about policy implementation
developed over the past twenty-five years.
The author contends that TANF recipients should not be pe-
nalized for delays caused by policy implementation, thus changes
in the 24-month TANF time limits are the most critical policy
target. Accordingly, coalitions of program staff, program partici-
pants, agency officials, employers, and funding representatives
can advocate for retroactive elimination of the 2-year penalty
and extension of recipients' 2-year time limits by the number of
months individuals lost because of delays in program start-up
or inappropriate referrals. In Pennsylvania, the 24-month limits
should be suspended until the Department of Public Welfare is
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technologically able to collect data that identifies TANF recip-
ient characteristics and assistance patterns sufficiently to make
appropriate matches with work programs, and until they can
also collect case record data on families no longer receiving as-
sistance in order to better balance program supply with recipient
demand. The 24-month limits should also be suspended until
County Assistance Office personnel are professionally qualified
to identify recipients' needs and refer them to appropriate pro-
grams and services; until training providers are fully funded and
operative; until program staff are trained in vocational assessment
(for full discussion, see Iversen, Lewis & Hartocollis, 1998); until
employer demands are systematically coordinated with program
funding requirements and skills content; and until the disconnect
between program supply and TANF recipient demand is fully
understood.
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NOTES
1. In July 1999, the name of all Private Industry Councils was changed
to Work Development Corporations to conform to parameters of the
Workforce Investment Act of 1998. In this paper, we used the name as it
was during our field research.
2. I wish to acknowledge the influence of the diagrammatic work of Raffel,
Mooney, & Finney (1999) for the model presented here.

